The Politics of Predicting Criminal Violence by Johnson, Sheri Lynn
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 6 
1988 
The Politics of Predicting Criminal Violence 
Sheri Lynn Johnson 
University of Minnesota 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law 
Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sheri L. Johnson, The Politics of Predicting Criminal Violence, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1322 (1988). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol86/iss6/27 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE POLITICS OF PREDICTING 
CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 
Sheri Lynn Johnson* 
THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE. Edited by Fernand N. 
Dutile and Cleon H. Foust. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas. 
1987. Pp. xviii, 238. $34.75. 
The Prediction of Criminal Violence reports the papers and discus-
sions that took place at the Multi-Disciplinary Conference on the Pre-
diction of Criminal Violence, held in Indianapolis, Indiana on April 26 
and 27, 1985. The Conference, organized by the Indiana Lawyers 
Commission, Inc. and the Research and Information Consortium of 
the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute, and chaired by Professor 
Norval Morris, brought together legal scholars, behavioral scientists, 
and criminal justice system practitioners to consider various issues 
concerning the prediction of criminal violence. The proceedings make 
fascinating and disturbing reading. 
When I sat down to read this book for the first time, I was in the 
middle of revising an essay considering the effects of unconscious ra-
cism on the criminal justice system and on criminal procedure deci-
sions. The essay's immediate impetus was the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 1 in which the Court upheld the Geor-
gia death penalty against an equal protection challenge based on a so-
phisticated statistical study. That study revealed large and significant 
differences in the imposition of the death penalty between white victim 
and black victim cases, and smaller but still significant differences be-
tween black defendant and white defendant cases. As I read this book, 
my mind still focused on unconscious racism, two thoughts kept re-
curring: first, that the standards governing the reliability required of 
scientific evidence that will be used to justify a person's further incar-
ceration or execution are astonishingly different from the standards for 
evidence that will be used to prove racial discrimination in the sen-
tencing process; and second, that decisions to predict criminal violence 
and to use those predictions to deprive individuals of liberty should be 
considered in light of their racially disparate impact, a consideration 
treated as insignificant by this Conference. 
Initially, I rejected these reactions as peripheral to the focus of this 
* Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1975, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1979, 
Yale University. - Ed. 
1. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). 
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Conference, as the product of my own intellectual and political obses-
sions. But as I contemplated the two issues that the participants de-
scribed as dominant - the accuracy of predictions of criminal 
violence and the legitimacy of various uses of those predictions - I 
realized (with some relief, given my commitment to write this review) 
that my first reaction related to the accuracy question and my second 
to the legitimacy debate. After rereading the various contributions, I 
was struck by the extent to which the definition of the accuracy ques-
tion and the determination of which legitimacy challenges to include 
are highly political questions. Idiosyncratic responses are to be ex-
pected; the book contains some very interesting ones. They are also 
fruitful, though the book would have been better if the legitimating 
function of the conference agenda had been explicitly discussed,2 and 
the range of political interests represented by the speakers broadened. 
In one sense, the complaints of insufficient attention to premises 
and inadequate representation of relevant viewpoints can be leveled at 
almost any symposium. Any agenda, however broad, can always be 
self-consciously questioned. Whatever the number of speakers, more 
might be invited to address other perspectives. In some ways, this 
book reflects a commendable consideration of both agenda and speak-
ers. Both the novice and the expert are accommodated: The first 
speaker, Henry Steadman, gave an overview of what prediction is and 
how it might be criticized, thus rendering the subsequent papers acces-
sible to those previously unfamiliar with the general topic yet quite 
comprehensive footnotes are provided to aid the reader with a re-
search interest in one of the subtopics. The speakers included repre-
sentatives from each profession with a stake in the prediction of 
criminal violence. As a result, the selections range from purely theo-
retical discussions about the retributive and utilitarian purposes of 
punishment, to technical explanations of the proper interpretation of 
actuarial and clinical data, to political arguments about expenditures 
for alternatives to incarceration. 
So far, so good. We could quibble about whether the hardline 
crime control advocates have been adequately represented, particu-
larly in the separate section concerning the prediction of criminal vio-
lence for juveniles, but certainly the book cannot be criticized as being 
narrow or one-sided. The problem is that there are more than two 
sides, and more to consider than half-a-dozen professions. What 
about the nonprofessional far side: the pretrial detainee at the bail 
hearing, the defendant at sentencing, the prisoner before the parole 
board? Although no consensus is reached in this book, a majority 
2. Dean Singer did begin his talk by noting that the definition of "dangerousness" is highly 
political, and that nonviolent white-collar offenders, such as toxic waste dumpers and corrupt 
politicians, may be more dangerous than "violent" criminals. However, he then chose to "avoid 
that volatile issue." P. 56. 
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view is described in the conference summary and recapitulation. But 
any determination of a majority view depends upon to whom the 
franchise is granted and who is allowed to address the enfranchised. It 
may be obvious that the subjects of criminal violence predictions can-
not be speakers at a conference or enfranchised participants in the 
political process, but it is not obvious why the issues could not be con-
sidered from their perspective. Their perspective would seem to be 
important to decisionmakers for both fairness and efficiency reasons. 
At this point a rational decisionmaker would have to take some 
notice of the characteristics of these subjects, one of which is their 
racial identity. Although black Americans make up about 12% of our 
population, they constitute 41 % of the 275,000 people in local jails 
awaiting trial or serving short terms there; 45% of the 547,000 in-
mates of state and federal prisons; and 30% of the 2.4 million people 
currently on parole or probation. One would imagine that the racially 
disparate impact of any criminal justice system practice would matter 
to many of these subjects of criminal violence prediction - and 
should, I submit, matter to policymakers. It seems to me that even a 
feeble attempt to consider possible responses of the black detainee, 
prisoner, parolee, or probationer to the positions taken in this book 
would shed a different - and darker - light on both the accuracy and 
legitimacy issues; hence the following feeble attempt. 3 
As a logical matter, the uninitiated reader might expect the legiti-
macy of predictions of criminal violence to be addressed before consid-
eration of their accuracy. After reading Henry Steadman's review of 
the accuracy literature, however, the same reader might well wonder 
why the participants bothered to come to the Conference at all. In 
studies of clinical prediction of violence in the criminal justice system 
(usually by psychiatrists), the best any clinician has done is to make 
two incorrect predictions for every correct prediction. Although actu-
arial predictions (those based on statistical models) are almost always 
better than clinical predictions, the best actuarial predictions improve 
upon chance probabilities only to a trivial extent. In most cases, pre-
dictions from the base rate were not improved upon. 
The advocates of prediction responded to this embarrassing picture 
in two ways. One was to tum to the prospects and techniques for 
improving predictive accuracy. For example, Stephen Gottfredson, 
Executive Director of the Maryland Criminal Justice Coordinating 
Council, expressed enthusiasm over the possibility of using situational 
factors to predict violence; and Seymour Halleck, of the University of 
North Carolina Medical School, stressed the importance of providing 
3. I do not pretend to have any relevant experience, expertise, or knowledge, but I suppose 
that even armchair speculation is better than treating the subjects of violence prediction as un· 
thinking objects. Even if my speculations are quite mistaken, I hope they illustrate the desirabil-
ity of consulting someone with more insight into the subjects' perspectives. 
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observations rather than conclusions, perhaps incorporating actuarial 
data into clinical predictions. This kind of response is interesting and 
perhaps potentially useful, but certainly does nothing to justify using 
predictions now. 
The second response, stressed by Gottfredson and relied upon by 
Marc Miller, Attorney-Advisor for the Office of Legal Counsel of the 
Justice Department, was to contrast actuarial predictions with intui-
tive judgments. Because judges and parole boards do predict and be-
cause their unaided predictions are even less accurate than chance, 
actuarial predictions are better than the current system of implicit and 
ignorant guesses. Gottfredson acknowledged one problem with this 
argument: there is no evidence that implementing an empirically 
based predictive system serves to reduce the prevalence of violent 
crimes. He attributed this failure to human error and to the alteration 
of predictors based on policy considerations. (As a later commenta-
tor, Gerome Miller from the National Center of Institutional Alterna-
tives, pointed out, this could also be explained by the criminogenic 
effect of incarceration.) Then why predict? Gottfredson answers that 
prediction increases the reliability of criminal justice decisions, thus 
advancing equity. But, as a member of the audience asked, should not 
"crime controllers" bear the burden of proving that implementing an 
actuarially based prediction system will be more effective in reducing 
crime than would be a determinative sentencing system - which is 
also highly reliable? Norval Morris, as discussion leader, answered 
that less harm would be done by frankly recognizing the "realities" of 
prediction and attempting "to identify when prediction should be used 
to allocate deserved punishment" (p. 68). 
Why is it "reality" that prediction will persist but not that intuitive 
prediction will persist? One can certainly imagine formally removing 
violence prediction as a factor from pretrial detention, sentencing, and 
parole decisions just as one can imagine replacing intuitive predictions 
with actuarial tables. Is it politics that limits the imagination here? 
Does the public demand prediction in all of these decisions? What 
supposedly justifies inaccurate prediction then is that it is an improve-
ment over politically foreseeable alternatives. But if such "realities" 
are claimed to resolve the accuracy issue, further "realities" also must 
be considered. 
Barefoot v. Estelle 4 comes to mind. In Barefoot, the Supreme 
Court was confronted with conclusive empirical evidence demonstrat-
ing that psychiatrists cannot predict violent behavior accurately, with 
disclaimers by both the American Psychiatric Association and the 
American Psychological Association of professional competence to 
predict violent behavior, and with egregious behavior on the part of 
the two Texas psychiatrists proffered by the state as experts, Grigson 
4. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
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("Dr. Death") and Holbrook. Yet the Court held evidence based 
upon clinical predictions of future dangerousness admissible as rele-
vant to the ultimate issue of the imposition of the death penalty. I 
would suppose that the literate death row inmate would note the con-
trast between this evidence and the sophisticated empirical study prof-
fered and rejected in McC/eskey v. Kemp; he might be struck by the 
thought that the Court affords substantially more deference to profes-
sionally decried testimony increasing the likelihood of a death sen-
tence, than it does to professionally acclaimed studies offered for the 
purpose of showing death sentences are influenced by improper fac-
tors. At least, that thought certainly strikes me. True, there is a dif-
ference between deeming evidence admissible and deeming it sufficient 
proof of the disputed proposition. But the professional evaluation of 
these two kinds of evidence takes into account these differences. There 
is also an argument for deference to state choices when causal relation-
ships are uncertain. But is there not an equally compelling argument 
for requiring the state to meet strict standards when lives are at stake? 
If political "realities" count in resolving accuracy questions, then two 
further "realities" must be considered: inculpatory evidence is more 
welcome than exculpatory evidence, and legitimating conclusions are 
awarded more weight than delegitimating ones. 5 Surely experts ought 
to consider the risk that their data and conclusions may not be used in 
a neutral fashion. When viewed in the abstract, accuracy objections to 
immediate implementation of violence predictions seem unanswerable; 
taking note of political "realities" only makes the objections stronger. 
The proffered justifications for implementing a system of "scien-
tific" predictions that are no more successful than chance were not 
debated or explored by other speakers. Nor did anyone challenge 
Gottfredson's assertion that lack of accuracy is not devastating to sci-
entific prediction because scientific prediction increases reliability and, 
hence, equity. Perhaps this is because everyone else was in a hurry to 
get to the legitimacy arguments. Dean Singer argued that whether or 
not prediction is accurate, it does not belong in the criminal justice 
system. He waved the retribution flag, arguing that the criminal law is 
about blame for past wrongdoing and should not be tainted by utilitar-
ian concerns about future behavior. (Singer's retributive theory is not 
limited to punishment proportionate to the forbidden act. He would 
consider a variety of facts about the offense and the off ender, but only 
in so far as those facts affect culpability.) Miller disagreed, arguing 
that, if properly constrained (for example, to "customary" uses of pre-
diction rather than "extraordinary" ones), predictions of dangerous-
ness are a permissible factor in sentencing decisions. Because it is not 
5. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 899 (1985), affd., 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987) (citing 
part of the disputed study as demonstrating that much irrationality has been removed from death 
sentences while discounting the study's conclusions about racial disparities). 
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possible to say exactly what punishment is deserved for a particular 
offense, fairness requires only that the criminal act and criminal record 
be used to set limits on possible sentencing decisions; "[w]ithin the 
resulting ranges of discretionary justice, predictions of dangerousness 
can properly be applied to distinguish among members of a group, all 
of whom are receiving their retributive due - their just deserts" (p. 
48). Several of the contributors seemed to accept this approach or 
similarly "eclectic" justifications for using predictions of dangerous-
ness as part of the pretrial detention, sentencing, and parole decisions: 
Individual justice was perceived as a concern and a constraint, but it 
could be balanced against community welfare. 
Other speakers avoided this retribution/crime control debate by 
focusing on alternatives to incarceration that would be more desirable 
for both society and the individual. As these contributors pointed out, 
one can use the statistical and clinical data for purposes other than 
determining sentence length; the information can be used to determine 
bail conditions, the intensity of probation supervision, the design of a 
rehabilitation plan, or the identification of target groups for social pro-
grams. These participants transformed the legitimacy question from 
an equity issue into another opportunity for debating what is humane 
and effective treatment of offenders. 
This is an appropriate transformation, at least at some point. To 
assume that the only rational use of clinical and statistical predictions 
of violence is to determine whom to incapacitate for how long is a big 
assumption, and it needs to be challenged. But because devising inca-
pacitation strategies has been the purpose behind violence prediction 
efforts to date, it seems to me that it would have been useful to explore 
further the legitimacy of using such predictions as a factor in decisions 
about incarceration. Certainly Singer's position is the most basic ob-
jection. I suppose the typical reader has already decided how she feels 
about the purposes of the criminal law and therefore will either agree 
or disagree that blame and deserts are the only proper considerations 
in meting out punishment. But for the reader who does not agree with 
Singer, yet is not fully persuaded by Miller and Morris - and maybe 
for the inmate who would not respond to fairness questions in such 
theoretical terms - there are some intermediate positions to consider. 
Even if there is a range of punishment for each offense that might, in 
the abstract, seem just, just punishment may be relative and therefore 
not susceptible to abstract evaluation. My own experience with crimi-
nal defendants and inmates is that most of their complaints focus on 
disparities between their own treatment and that of others considered 
similarly blameworthy, rather than on the absolute harshness of the 
term imposed upon them. To the subject of a detention, sentencing, or 
parole decision, the reason why the upper or lower bound of the dis-
cretionary range was chosen may be crucial in evaluating its fairness; 
defendants often object to the lighter sentences received by informers. 
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Moreover, the aggregate effects of using particular criteria may also 
affect the subjects' perceptions of fairness; inmates frequently com-
plain that rich defendants get lighter sentences and nicer prisons. In 
my view these additional fairness considerations are valid and should 
not be denigrated. In other contexts, we certainly would attend to 
them, whether or not we would view them as dispositive, for example, 
in the discipline of siblings, or the grading of students. 6 
This brings us to race. If there is any criterion that should not be 
used, if there is any disparate impact that is disturbing, this is it. The 
subjects would care. Any criminal justice system decisionmaker 
should at least think about racial equity, given the composition of of-
fender populations. Yet this volume contains no affirmative argu-
ments that race is worth worrying about. Instead, the reader is 
informed in a backhanded way that there are racially disparate im-
pacts in criminal prediction. There is, perhaps, even some quiet con-
sideration of race as a predictor. Miller noted that there may be 
racially disparate impacts of predicting violence, but quickly assured 
the reader that such impacts are not the result of bias, or if they are, 
that those impacts stem from biases in other parts of the criminal jus-
tice system. The pretrial detention paper noted that race predicts 
whether crimes will be committed while the defendant is on bail and 
said that this raises "serious questions." The participants who dis-
cussed violent crime prediction for juveniles also noted correlations 
with race, but did not discuss implications. Gottfredson mentioned 
policy considerations as limiting the accuracy of predictions by pre-
cluding the use of some variables; following the footnote trail reveals 
that the allusion is to the elimination of race from the federal parole 
guidelines. Finally, the psychiatrist's contribution notes an advantage 
of clinical prediction over actuarial prediction: the clinician can 
"launder" out race and other disturbing variables so that they need 
not be discussed. Here the footnote refers to Monahan's Predicting 
Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques. 7 If the reader 
consults Monahan to learn what "laundering" means, it turns out that 
Monahan advises clinicians to incorporate actuarial data into their 
predictions, that he educates clinicians to the strong correlation be-
tween race and recidivist violence, and that he describes the clinicians' 
opportunity to conceal the role of some actuarial variables as desirable 
given judicial feelings about explicit consideration of these statistical 
relationships. He does, however, caution the clinician to consider 
whether using such predictors as race violates the clinician's personal 
ethics.8 
6. We do not find it silly to discuss whether effort should be a factor in grading. We may 
question whether, if we do count effort, we will largely reward apple polishers. 
7. P. 74. J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL 
TECHNIQUES (1981). 
8. J. MONAHAN, supra note 7, at 32-36. 
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There is enough uncertainty here to raise the specter of equal pro-
tection violations. Certainly, if a· court relied upon a clinical predic-
tion from a clinician who factored race into his prediction but did not 
disclose that factor, an equal protection violation would have oc-
curred. The application of the purposeful discrimination requirement 
to actuarial predictions is less clear. If a statistician first checks for a 
correlation between race and recidivism, finds it, and then eliminates 
race as a predictor on both ethical and mathematical grounds due to 
the high degree of overlap with other variables (as did the designers of 
the federal parole guidelines), is this purposeful discrimination? It cer-
tainly is more than disparate impact, but I suppose how much more 
depends on exactly what was in the statistician's mind. 
Whether or not equal protection constraints have been violated (or 
will be violated) by various predictions of violence from the criminal 
justice system, it seems unlikely that such violations will often - if 
ever - be proved. But certainly this does not end the matter. The 
likelihood of at least occasional covert violations should be one source 
of caution about violence prediction. 
Even more damning, to my mind, is the matter of pervasive dispa-
rate effect. Of course, the criminal justice system as a whole has dispa-
rate impact on minorities. But in some measure this is justified (or 
perhaps only legitimated, given the prevalence of undetected and un-
derprosecuted white white-collar criminals9) by differential blamewor-
thiness; at least in part, more minorities go to prison because more 
minorities are detected committing crimes. Other aspects of the crimi-
nal justice system's disparate impact are not defensible at all, but are 
well entrenched and very difficult to eliminate, the most notable being 
covertly biased exercises of discretion. Prison sentences are not about 
to be eliminated; neither is discretion. But here we have a proposed 
new feature, known or strongly suspected to have disproportionately 
severe effects on minorities, a feature that is not justified by blamewor-
thiness principles and not demonstrated actually to reduce criterion 
offenses. What would make us embrace it, if not a very heavy dose of 
selective indifference10 to the concerns of the racially different? I can-
not see that reliable decisionmaking, as touted by Gottfredson, is 
worth this cost. 
What I can or cannot see may be irrelevant, but it does seem to me 
that the subjects of these decisions might well have the same reaction, 
and that such reactions ought to be explored. This is not a novel idea; 
Professor John Coffee sought to arouse interest in this issue ten years 
9. See generally c. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41-47 (1978). 
10. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976). 
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ago. 11 
One might castigate the conference planners at this point. I sup-
pose what I have said thus far is already implicit castigation. Yet I 
think the broader question this book illuminates is more important: If 
experts, informed about disparate impact, could virtually ignore racial 
equity issues, can we really expect legislators and administrators to be 
more sensitive? I come back to McCleskey. After concluding that the 
disparate racial impact did not prove purposeful discrimination (so-
phisticated statistical analyses notwithstanding), and after raising slip-
pery slope concerns, Justice Powell noted an additional reason not to 
respond to racial disparities in capital sentencing: "McCleskey's argu-
ments are best presented to the legislative bodies."12 Really? Only if 
we want such arguments ignored. 
11. Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in 
the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975 (1978). 
12. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1781 (1987). 
